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What notion of possibility should We use in 
assessing scientific thought experiments?1 
Rawad El Skaf
1 – Introduction
The literature on TEs has grown exponentially these last dec-
ades and different epistemological accounts have been pro-
posed. TEs have been characterized as limiting cases of ex-
periments (e.g. Sorensen 1992, Laymon 1991, Buzzoni 2010), 
mental models (e.g. Nersessian 1992, Gendler 1998) logical 
arguments (e.g. Norton since 1991) or Platonic a priori av-
enues to laws of nature (e.g. Brown since 1986). To assess 
these epistemic accounts, we should analyse how they answer 
the following two sets of questions.
The first set of questions is about epistemic issues: If TEs can 
teach us something new about the world and our theories, 
then what kind of “new” knowledge do they produce? How 
could TEs give us new knowledge without any new empiri-
cal data? Do they justify their conclusions? And how do they 
achieve this goal (e.g. by mere argumentation, by intuiting 
laws of nature, by simulative model based reasoning, and so 
forth)? Noting that TEs seem to be so diverse and to fulfil dif-
ferent epistemological functions, answers to this set of ques-
tions, therefore, cannot be given merely on the basis of one 
or two examples. Most accounts in the literature purport to 
answer these questions explicitly: they define what TEs are, 
how they function and the kind of new knowledge we should 
gain through them.
The second set of questions is about modal issues and con-
cerns, more precisely, the notions of possibility we should ex-
pect to find in TEs: since we are dealing with thought, rather 
than real, experiments, what restrictions should we impose 
on the scenario of a (successful) scientific TE? What notion 
of possibility, as opposed to the actuality of real experiments, 
should we expect to deal with in TEs? Different answers to 
these questions lead to locate TEs closer either to our theories 
or to the world.
The main goal of this paper is to address the second set, while 
shedding light on the first.2 The paper is divided into 4 sec-
tions. In section 2, I define the relevant concept of possibility 
in scientific TEs. In section 3, I elaborate on this concept with 
two case studies: Maxwell’s original demon and Einstein’s 
photon box. In section 4, I use the evolution of the discussed 
case studies in order to identify a general mechanism of evo-
lution for TEs.
2 – The possibility of the sce-
nario of a TE  
When a TEer performs a TE he/she usually imagines a sce-
nario (e.g., the free fall of two objects in two situations: alone, 
then linked together as to form a compound). He/she men-
tally unfolds it (how should these objects fall in the two sit-
uations, according to the theories assumed in the scenario) 
and obtains a result (the compound should fall both faster 
and slower than the heavier object). Finally, he/she uses this 
result in order to say something about a specific theory (Ar-
istotle’s theory of free fall is false, the speed of a free-falling 
object is independent of its absolute weight).
 
It is usually claimed that TEs involve imaginary (hypothetical 
or even counterfactual) scenarios, but an explicit description 
of such scenarios is rarely offered. Here are five elements 
usually present in a scenario of a scientific TE: 
a - Theories, laws and principles: Aristotle’s theory of 
free fall, quantum mechanics, Heisenberg’s principle, rel-
ativity theory, thermodynamics, kinetic theory.
It is usually claimed that in order to assess a thought experiment (hereafter TE) we 
should assess the nomological possibility, or realizability in principle, of its scenario. 
This is undoubtedly true for many TEs, such as Bohr’s reply to Einstein’s photon box. 
Nevertheless, in some cases, such as Maxwell’s demon, this requirement should be 
relaxed. Many accounts of TEs fail in this regard. In particular, experimental and some 
mental model accounts are too strict, since they always require realizability in prin-
ciple. This paper aims at analysing the notion of possibility at play in the scenarios of 
scientific TEs, and sheds some new light on their nature and function.
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b - Fictive, mechanic and natural processes: A demon 
who separates molecules, weight measuring process, ra-
dioactive disintegration.
c - Fictive and natural particulars: A demon, a cat.   
d - Dynamics of the particulars, specially the fictive ones: 
A demon opens and closes a massless door, Einstein’s be-
ing who accelerates an elevator.
e - Idealizations: Massless door, no air resistance.
Since the scenario of a TE involves particulars with their dy-
namics and processes, we are tempted to ask whether they 
are possible. Nevertheless, what notion of possibility should 
we use? Since the scenario delimits a theoretical framework, 
the relevant notion of possibility should thus be nomological 
–  i.e. relating to a theory, law or principle. 
However, restricting ourselves to nomological possibili-
ty does not mean that scenarios of successful scientific TEs 
should always be possible under actual theories, laws or 
principles. Some latitude must be given to the scientist in 
conceiving his/her scenario. In this section I will start by de-
fining what I mean by a nomologically possible scenario and 
argue that this notion generalizes a requirement largely found 
in the literature. I will then reject this requirement with the 
aid of Maxwell’s demon case study, which contains a scenario 
whose nomological possibility remains indeterminate.
 
2.1 Nomologically possible scenarios
I will start with the definition of nomologically possible sce-
narios:
A scenario of a scientific TE is nomologically possible 
if the scientist imagines some particulars (e.g., photons, 
a cat), their dynamics (e.g., let one photon escape from 
a box, place the cat in an opaque box), and mechanic or 
natural processes (e,g, weight measuring, atomic disin-
tegration). These elements are sufficiently described and 
possible under some specific and actual theory, law or 
principle, applicable to the scenario.
These scenarios describe in principle, or nearly realizable 
imaginary experiments. That is, they describe experiments 
that could be performed in the real world – modulo, of 
course, some specific and necessary idealizations. Precisely 
these idealizations can be questioned by the scientific com-
munity (above all by the defender of the criticized theory or 
by the opponent of a newly postulated theory, law or princi-
ple). In fact, the choice of the particulars in some TEs makes 
these idealizations more or less acceptable. This is especially 
the case in Galileo’s Pisa tower TE, in which Galileo describes 
objects, of the same heavy material and of a spherical shape, 
free falling in a rare medium. These particulars allow Galileo 
to idealize the effect of air resistance, without assuming the 
existence of a vacuum.
It should be noted that in a nomologically possible scenario 
the scientist could also employ fictive particulars (e.g. Ein-
stein’s being) and their dynamics (Einstein’s being pulling a 
rope), yet the resulting fictive process (Einstein’s being accel-
erating an elevator) should be easily substitutable with a me-
chanical or natural process (a rocket accelerating the elevator 
for example) and the theories that describe it (Newton laws 
of action and reaction).
We find this notion of possibility in several accounts of TEs, 
even if it is described differently:
In his 1964 seminal article on TEs, Thomas Kuhn raises and 
answers the following epistemological question: “How, […] 
relying exclusively upon familiar data, can a thought exper-
iment lead to new knowledge or to new understanding of 
nature?” (Kuhn 1964, reprinted in Kuhn 1977, p. 241). Since 
then, an extensive philosophical literature emerged and dif-
ferent epistemological accounts of TEs have been proposed. 
Most address Kuhn’s puzzle, but they rarely explicitly ques-
tion its underlying assumption concerning the familiarity of 
the data.3 Just before raising his epistemological question, 
Kuhn assumes that “[g]ranting that every successful thought 
experiment embodies in its design some prior information 
about the world, that information is not itself at issue in the 
experiment. On the contrary, if we have to do with a real 
thought experiment, the empirical data upon which it rests 
must have been both well known and generally accepted be-
fore the experiment was even conceived” (Ibid.). On the basis 
of this assumption, Kuhn can give an answer to the follow-
ing more specific question: “since the situation imagined in 
a thought experiment clearly may not be arbitrary, to what 
conditions of verisimilitude is it subject?” (Ibid.). Such an an-
swer is precisely that “nothing about the imagined situation 
may be entirely unfamiliar or strange” (All emphases added, 
Ibid., p. 252).
Kathleen Wilkes’ (1988) scepticism about TEs in philosophy 
is mainly based on her demand that scenarios of TEs should 
be nomologically possible. Wilkes insists that TEs in philoso-
phy are misleading since, unlike TEs in science, they usually 
involve scenarios that violate known laws of nature. For ex-
ample, Wilkes rejects Parfit’s splitting persons on the ground 
that “the sum of laws that group us together as human beings 
(a natural kind category) precludes our splitting into two” 
(Wilkes 1988, p. 36).
Tamar Szabó Gendler (1998), following Kuhn’s account, 
claims that “[t]o draw a conclusion on the basis of a thought 
experiment is to make a judgement about what would happen 
if the particular state of affairs described in some imaginary 
scenario were actually to obtain.” (My emphasis, Gendler 
1998, p. 398).
In order to account for TEs, Nancy Nersessian (1992) appeals 
3 - Humphreys (1993) explicitly addresses and criticizes this familiarity condition but with different arguments from the ones presented in this paper.
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to mental models of the type posited by some cognitive psy-
chologists for the comprehension of narratives in general. 
Roughly, her idea is that TEs in science are narratives that 
function like any other narrative, and as such “thought ex-
perimenting is a form of ‘simulative model-based reasoning’. 
That is, thought experimenters reason by manipulating men-
tal models of the situation depicted in the thought experi-
mental narrative” (Nersessian 1992, pp. 291-2). Nersessian 
lists five features of TEs characterized as involving mental 
models. When discussing the second one, she claims that: 
“Feature 2: The reader is invited to follow through a se-
quence of events or processes as one would in the real 
world. That is, even if the situation may seem bizarre or 
fantastic, such as being in a chest in outer space, there is 
nothing bizarre in the unfolding. Objects behave as they 
would in the real world in the presence or absence of grav-
ity. The assumption is that if the experiment could be per-
formed, the chain of events would unfold according to the 
way things usually take place in the world.” (Ibid., p. 295).
In 1999, Nersessian further claims that “unlike the fiction-
al narrative, however, the context of the scientific thought 
experiment makes the intention clear to the reader that the 
situation is one that is to represent a potential real-world sit-
uation” (Nersessian 1999, p.19).
Roy Sorensen (1992) claims that a TE is “an experiment [...] 
that purports to achieve its aim without the benefit of exe-
cution” (Sorensen 1992, p. 205). The fifth proposition in his 
necessity refuter regimented scheme explicitly states: “the 
content of the thought experiment is a possibility” (Ibid., p. 
135). The TEer is thus explicitly committed to this possibility 
statement.4 
Ronald Laymon (1991) in his experimental approach also 
claims that TEs are similar to real experiments: they are “ide-
al limits of real experimentation” (Laymon 1991, p. 167). He 
claims that to defend this approach we need to “(1) show that 
there exists a series of experimental refinements such that 
real experiments can be made to approach the postulated 
idealized thought experiment” (Ibid., p. 174).
Finally, Marco Buzzoni (2010) in his transcendental-oper-
ational account of TEs claims: “[a]ll thought experiments 
must be thought of as translatable into real ones, and all 
real experiments as realisations of thought ones. What 
thought experiments have over and above real experiments is 
the mere fact that they exist in a purely hypothetical sphere; 
what real have over and above thought experiments is the 
mere fact that they overstep the sphere of the possible, in the 
experiment’s real execution” (Buzzoni 2010, p. 1).
These restrictions, even if they are stated differently, share a 
common underlying intuition best labelled as the Nomologi-
cal Possibility Thesis (NPT): 
NPT: The Scenario of any (successful) scientific TE 
should be nomologically possible. 
Thus, Galileo dropping two objects while idealizing air re-
sistance, Schrödinger leaving a cat to his fate facing a deadly 
mechanism, and even Einstein’s being accelerating an eleva-
tor in the absence of gravity are all compatible with NPT.
 
Nevertheless, there is room for arguing that NPT is too re-
strictive and even irrelevant for some TEs. In some cases, the 
TEer conceives a scenario that contains data, processes or 
particulars, which are “unfamiliar or strange”. The scenario 
imagined is not explicitly taken to be a “potential real-world 
situation”, “actually to obtain”, or “as translatable into [a] real 
one” and so forth, even with all the necessary idealizations. 
That is, in some TEs, we are presented with non-nomologi-
cally possible scenarios. In this paper, I shall analyse a sce-
nario whose nomological possibility remains indeterminate.
2.2 Scenario whose nomological possibility re-
mains indeterminate
As before, let’s start with a definition:
A scenario of a scientific TE whose nomological pos-
sibility remains indeterminate is a scenario in which 
under-described particulars and their dynamics are im-
agined by the scientist, in such a way that they give rise to 
fictive processes whose nomological possibility remains 
open.
The nomological possibility remains open in the sense that 
even with our best theories we are not in a position to say 
whether the processes imagined in such a scenario are pos-
sible or not. They are not even presented by the scientist as 
nomologically possible processes, or even substitutable with 
nomologically possible processes. Maxwell’s demon TE, an-
alysed in the next section, is a canonical example: Maxwell 
imagines an under-described, fictive particular (a demon) 
and its dynamics (the demon opens and closes a massless5 
door) that amounts to a fictive process capable of separating 
fast from slow molecules.
 
A fundamental distinction should be noted at this point, 
namely the distinction between a process and its result. Here 
I am concerned with the former, rather than the latter. More 
specifically, in the case of Maxwell’s demon, I am assessing 
the nomological possibility of the processes described in the 
scenario (i.e., the process of molecular separation), but I am 
not analysing, at this stage, what this process leads to (i.e., 
the resulting separation between slow molecules on one side 
4  - This is less clear in Sorensen’s account since he analyzes the different kinds of impossibilities in TEs (cf. Sorensen 1992, pp. 200-202) and claims that “we are committed to [...] 
law contravening thought experiments” (Ibid., p. 201). Nevertheless, this seems in tension with his necessity refuter scheme since in this latter all TEs could be legitimately refuted 
if the critics consider its content impossible (Ibid., pp. 148-152).
5 - A massless door is nomologically impossible according to our best theories, nevertheless it is an acceptable idealization in Maxwell’s scenario. As we will see, something close 
to this idealization will be rejected by Feynman.
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and fast molecules on the other).
Finally, there are also nomologically impossible scenarios 
that I will not consider here, for example, because the TEer 
deliberately assumes some false theory (e.g. different laws of 
motion), or employs some explicitly nomologically impossi-
ble processes (e.g. Norton’s machine that is capable of revers-
ing digestion process6).
3 – Demons and Clocks
In this section I will analyse two case studies that instantiate 
both kinds of scenarios defined above, and their “evolutions”: 
Maxwell’s demon and Einstein’s photon box. Both TEs em-
ploy under-described processes: the demon mode of opera-
tion in the former, weighing and time measuring processes 
in the latter. I will then expose how both TEs have evolved, 
so to speak, in subsequent versions that better describe these 
processes. In the Maxwell’s demon case, among the many 
evolutions of this TE, Marian von Smoluchowski (1912) and 
Richard Feynman (1977) described mechanical processes of 
molecular separation. In Einstein’s photon box, Niels Bohr 
(1949) proposed a better description, theoretically and tech-
nically, of Einstein’s scenario. The difference between these 
two evolutions is that, in the former, the better described sce-
nario was not aimed at refuting Maxwell’s TE. While in the 
latter, Bohr’s better described scenario was precisely aimed 
at refuting Einstein’s TE, by refuting its scenario’s  nomolog-
ical possibility.
3.1 Maxwell’s original demon
James C. Maxwell presented his TE in a letter to Peter G. Tait 
(1867), searching to “pick a hole in the second law”. It was 
then published for the first time at the end of Theory of heat 
(1871), in a section called “limitation of the Second Law of 
Thermodynamics”. One hundred and fifty pages before pre-
senting his demon, Maxwell underlines the difference in na-
ture between the first and the second laws of thermodynam-
ics, with the following argument: 
“Admitting heat to be a form of energy, the second law as-
serts that it is impossible, by the unaided action of natural 
processes, to transform any part of the heat of a body into 
mechanical work, except by allowing heat to pass from 
that body into another at a lower temperature [...].
[S]uppose that a body contains energy in the form of heat, 
what are the conditions under which this energy or any 
part of it may be removed from the body? If heat in a body 
consists in a motion of its parts, and if we were able to 
distinguish these parts, guide and control their motion 
by any kind of mechanism, then by arranging our appa-
ratus so as to lay hold of every moving part of the body, 
we could, by a suitable train of mechanism, transfer the 
energy of the moving parts of the heated body to any oth-
er body in the form of ordinary motion. The heated body 
would thus be rendered cold and all its thermal energy 
would be converted into the visible motion of some other 
body. 
Now this supposition involves a direct contradiction to 
the second law of thermodynamics, but is consistent with 
the first law. The second law is therefore equivalent to 
a denial of our power to perform the operation just de-
scribed, either by a train of mechanism, or by any other 
method yet discovered. Hence, if the heat consists in the 
motion of its parts, the separate parts which move must 
be so small or so impalpable that we cannot in any way 
lay hold of them to stop them.” (My emphasis, Maxwell 
1871, pp. 153-54)
With this argument, Maxwell is exploring the way we should 
understand the second law of thermodynamics in the light of 
the newly formulated molecular theory, according to which 
“heat in a body consists in a motion of its parts”. In discussing 
the laws of thermodynamics, Maxwell starts by presenting 
the first law of thermodynamics (conservation of energy) and 
Carnot and Thomson’s formulation of the second law. He is 
arguing that the operation he just described involving a “suit-
able train of mechanism” is not prohibited by the first law 
and the laws of mechanics (“this supposition [...] is consistent 
with the first law”). It is, however, in “a direct contradiction” 
with the second. That is, while the first law could be grounded 
on the laws of mechanics, the second should “express some 
essentially non-mechanical aspect of nature. If it is to receive 
an explanation at the molecular level, that explanation must 
refer to the smallness of the molecules, or equivalently, to 
their enormous number” (Klein 1970, reprinted in Leff and 
Rex 2003, pp. 64-65).
Can we conceive of such a “suitable train of mechanism”? And 
what does it say about the nature of the second law? Maxwell, 
with his TE, explains what the demon should be capable of 
accomplishing, without fully describing how. His aim is to 
defend a statistical interpretation of the second law.
 
Let Maxwell speaks for himself:
6 - John Norton (2004) puts forward such a scenario in his critique of experimental accounts. His TE involves a scenario that cannot be obtained in reality, but 
whose description is made realistic anyway: “For example, a thought experiment quickly establishes that the time reversibility of physical law is not directly ex-
pressed in the phenomena. The phenomena manifest a decided unidirectionality in time. To see this, we need only imagine that we locate a familiar process in a 
device capable of reversing its time order. If the device is large enough to host a banquet, we would find elegantly dressed diners regurgitating the content of their 
stomachs, chewing it back to pristine morsels and modestly conveying them back to their plates with their forks—a process compatible with the physical laws but 
otherwise never seen. The thought experiment does not employ a continuous approach to some ideal limit, such as the gradual elimination of friction. Indeed the 
thought experiment is more effective the more we avoid idealization, that is, the more realistic we make the processes subject to time reversal” (Norton 2004, p. 
63, f. 12).
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“Before I conclude, I wish to direct attention to an aspect 
of the molecular theory which deserves consideration. 
One of the best established facts in thermodynamics is 
that it is impossible in a system enclosed in an envelope 
which permits neither change of volume nor passage of 
heat, and in which both the temperature and the pres-
sure are everywhere the same, to produce any inequality 
of temperature or of pressure without the expenditure of 
work. This is the second law of thermodynamics, and it 
is undoubtedly true as long as we can deal with bodies 
only in mass, and have no power of perceiving or han-
dling the separate molecules of which they are made up. 
But if we conceive a being whose faculties are so sharp-
ened that he can follow every molecule in its course, such 
a being, whose attributes are still as essentially finite as 
our own, would be able to do what is at present impossi-
ble to us. For we have seen that the molecules in a vessel 
full of air at uniform temperature are moving with veloc-
ities by no means uniform, though the mean velocity of 
any great number of them, arbitrarily selected, is almost 
exactly uniform. Now let us suppose that such a vessel is 
divided into two portions, A and B, by a division in which 
there is a small hole, and that a being, who can see the 
individual molecules, opens and closes this hole, so as to 
allow only the swifter molecules to pass from A to B, and 
only the slower ones to pass from B to A. He will thus, 
without expenditure of work, raise the temperature of B 
and lower that of A, in contradiction to the second law of 
thermodynamics.
This is only one of the instances in which conclusions 
which we have drawn from our experience of bodies con-
sisting of an immense number of molecules may be found 
not to be applicable to the more delicate observations and 
experiments which we may suppose made by one who can 
perceive and handle the individual molecules which we 
deal with only in large masses.
In dealing with masses of matter, while we do not perceive 
the individual molecules, we are compelled to adopt what 
I have described as the statistical method of calculation, 
and to abandon the strict dynamical method, in which we 
follow every motion by the calculus.” (My emphasis, Max-
well, 1871, pp. 308-309)
Maxwell aims at limiting the scope of the second law, as the 
title of his section suggests, with the help of his demon. In 
order to better understand what he means we have to look at 
the historical context. The classical phenomenological second 
law of thermodynamics was formulated without reference to 
the microscopic constitution of gases. In fact, it was originally 
formulated in the context of the caloric theory of heat, which 
defines heat as a moving substance. With the development of 
the kinetic theory, heat became defined in terms of molecular 
motion. It was argued by Clausius, and early Boltzmann, that 
the second law remains universally valid, applicable to any 
scale, and should be grounded on a dynamical method that 
traces each molecule in its course. 
Maxwell thought differently7 and used his demon to limit the 
scope of the second law of thermodynamics to aggregates of 
molecules, “which we deal with only in large masses”. That is, 
the second law has a statistical nature and should be limited 
to the macroscopic domain. It only applies to the observa-
tions made by someone who cannot perceive and manipulate 
individual molecules. If this capacity to perceive and manip-
ulate individual molecules turns out to be nomologically pos-
sible or not, remains open for Maxwell, as well as for us. He is 
arguing that, if the second law is to be grounded on molecular 
motion, it should reflect the treatment of molecules in bulk. 
This is what Maxwell meant by “statistical”8 in his conclusion 
that we should adopt the “statistical method of calculation, 
and to abandon the strict dynamical method, in which we 
follow every motion by the calculus”.
Note that Maxwell’s conclusion is not the rejection of the sec-
ond law, but rather the claim that it should be understood 
in statistical terms. This seems to be grounded on the idea 
that the nomological possibility of the demon is open: if the 
demon was assumed to be realizable in principle, then Max-
well should have, unjustifiably, concluded that the second 
law is simply false. Let us contrast Maxwell’s conclusion with 
a similar attempt “to pick a hole in the second law”. Accord-
ing to Daub (1970), Loschmidt (1876) conceived of a simi-
lar “Non-Demon” TE without a finite being to argue against 
Clausius statement of the second law. Loschmidt thought 
that such a device is nomologically possible and used his TE 
to undermine Clausius’ statement as a basis for the second 
law. He even went further and claimed that “the terrifying 
nimbus of the second law, by which it was made to appear as 
a principle annihilating the total life of the universe, would 
also be destroyed; [... mankind] would have an inexhaustible 
supply of transformable heat [into work] at hand in all ages” 
(Loschmidt 1876, p. 135, quoted from Daub 1970, reprinted 
in Leff and Rex 2003, p. 52). 
On the contrary, Maxwell left the nomological possibility of 
the demon open, he merely described what the demon should 
be able to accomplish, not how. The demon’s mechanism is 
under-described in the TE. Indeed, we are not given sufficient 
details of its mechanism to assess its nomological possibili-
ty. What is crucial for the TE to function is the result of the 
7 - Maxwell used a much lyrical style in writing to Tait about the dynamical interpretation: “But it is rare sport to see those learned Germans [i.e., Boltzmann and 
Clausius] contending for the priority in the discovery that the second law of [thermodynamics] is the Hamiltonsche Princip. [...] The Hamiltonsche Princip, the 
while, soars along in a region unvexed by statistical considerations while the German Icari flap their waxen wings in nephelococcygia, amid those cloudy forms 
which the ignorance and finitude of human science have invested with the incommunicable attributes of the invisible Queen of Heaven” (quoted from Knott 1911, 
pp. 115-116).
8 - Cf. Myrvold (2011) for a historical analysis of Maxwell’s statistical conclusion, opposed to probabilistic interpretation of the second law.
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demon’s action: fast molecules on one side and slow ones on 
the other. This result is nomologically possible under Max-
well’s kinetic theory and also not prohibited by a dynamical 
interpretation of the second law; nothing in the dynamics of 
individual molecules prohibits such a result. 
To put it differently, the TE aims at showing an external inco-
herence between the newly defended kinetic theory and a dy-
namical interpretation of the second law. In order to restore 
coherence, Maxwell defended a statistical interpretation of 
the second law which limits it to the macroscopic scale, to 
molecules treated en masse, where, by definition, we cannot 
manipulate individual molecules. For the purpose of the TE, 
we thus don’t need a full description of the demon’s 
mode of action in order to assess its possibility. 
Maxwell’s demon TE left us with the following dilem-
ma: either the demon turns out to be possible, but then 
the second law should be completely rejected; or the 
demon turns out to be impossible, then the second law 
should not be rejected, but still modified. These two alterna-
tives have been explored by subsequent versions of the TE 
appeared during the twentieth century.9 The next section is 
devoted to the explorations of such evolutions of Maxwell’s 
demon.
3.2 Nomological impossibility of mechanical 
demons10
Better described demons were, and still are, the subject of 
many TEs, computer simulations and even real experiments 
since the beginning of the twentieth century.11 Moreover, the 
aim of most of these attempts is to explore whether the sec-
ond law should be completely rejected.
In the early twentieth century, it had become clear that ther-
mal processes were statistical processes. Empirical violations 
arose in observable fluctuation phenomena, such as Brown-
ian motion of a pollen grain. The demon TE was then used 
to investigate better described demons instantiated by purely 
mechanical devices. The investigation was meant to answer 
(among other goals) the following questions: can the spon-
taneous existing microscopic violations of the second law be 
artificially accumulated to produce macroscopic violations? 
If not, what is the explanation of this failure? In other words, 
could there be nomologically possible demons, and if not, 
why? To answer these questions, different TEs, computer 
simulations and real experiments12 were proposed. Here is 
how two TEs were used.
3.2.1 Smoluchowski trapdoor
Marian Von Smoluchowski (1912) argued, through many TEs, 
that it would be impossible for a mechanical device to manip-
ulate molecules as intended. His now famous idea was to di-
vide the vessel with a trapdoor made asymmetric by a spring. 
The molecules should then accumulate in one chamber and 
create a density difference, which can be transformed to work 
in violation of the second law of thermodynamics (Fig. 1). It 
is hard to see why the mechanism cannot work as a perpetual 
motion machine of the second kind producing work for free. 
Nevertheless, Smoluchowski concluded that no work would 
be produced.
Fig. 1 Smoluchowski trapdoor (picture taken from Norton 
2005, p. 401). 
Here is how he argued: Since the trapdoor mechanism is in 
the same isolated container as the gas and needs to be light 
enough to allow molecules to pass through, it will reach a 
high thermal energy; thus, the trapdoor will be agitated by 
its own Brownian motion. Therefore, the trapdoor will open 
without any collision and, after a period of time, let the pas-
sage of molecules in the wrong direction. Thus, this mechan-
ical demon will fail to work as intended. From this device, as 
well as from different imaginary mechanisms, Smoluchowski 
concluded that:
“[I]t appears at present that the construction of a per-
petual motion machine that produces work continuously 
is excluded not by purely technical difficulties, but as a 
matter of principle.” (Smoluchowski 1912, p. 1079, quot-
ed from Norton 2013, p. 4439)
Smoluchowski is asserting here that a mechanical demon is 
nomologically impossible. Which permits him to conclude 
that:
“Molecular fluctuation phenomena today give us no rea-
son to overturn completely the Second Law of thermo-
dynamics, as we have so many other dogmas of physics. 
They compel us only to a weakened formulation, if we de-
mand universal validity for the laws of thermodynamics.” 
(My emphasis, Smoluchowski 1912, p. 1079, quoted from 
9 -Actually, there are even recent analyses. For example, Norton (2013) proposes a general argument for the impossibility of Maxwell’s demon based on statistical mechanics, 
in particular on a violation of Liouville’s theorem. By contrast, Hemmo and Shenker (2012) argue for the possibility of the demon, still basing their argumentation on statistical 
mechanics, in particular on a coarse-grained volume of phase space. Both analyses are beyond the scope of this paper. 
10 - For a substantial historical analysis of the twentieth century demons, from Maxwell to Bennett, cf. Earman and Norton (1998-99) and the references therein. Here I will not 
consider information theoretic exorcism of Maxwell’s demon. They are irrelevant to my purpose and they are rightly criticized in Earman & Norton (1999).
11 - Cf. Leff and Rex (2003) for an overview of many key papers on the subject.
12 - Cf. El Skaf and Imbert (2013) for a detailed comparison of these three methods in investigating nomologically possible demons.
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Smoluchowski then proposes the following reformulation of 
the second law:
“Perhaps an apparently quite minor extension of the 
wording suffices, in so far as one says: There can be no 
automatic device that would produce continuously usable 
work at the expense of the lowest temperature. The brief 
version [of the Second Law] ‘impossibility of a perpetual 
motion machine of the second kind’ is even sufficient, for 
one has transferred the difficulty into the explication of 
the latter concept.” (Ibid.)
That is, Smoluchowski is exploring, with his TE, the afore-
mentioned alternatives: either the demon is possible and 
we should completely reject the second law, or the demon is 
impossible and we should modify it. Smoluchowski, with his 
demon TE, argued in favour of the latter.
3.2.2 Feynman ratchet and pawl 
A very close TE, based on a germane mechanism, “the ratchet 
and pawl” (Fig. 2) is presented by Richard Feynman (1977). 
Feynman’s analysis is in the same spirit as Smoluchowski’s. 
The bombardment of particles in the right container pushes 
the vane in both directions, but because of the ratchet and 
pawl in the left container, the mechanism should move in one 
direction and produce work, in violation of the second law of 
thermodynamics.
Fig. 2 Feynman’s ratchet and pawl (Feynman et al. 1977, 46-
1, 1). 
Nevertheless, Feynman goes on to explain that this result 
cannot in fact be obtained, he explains what idealizations are 
not permitted in the imagined mechanism:
“First, our idealized ratchet is as simple as possible, but 
even so, there is a pawl, and there must be a spring in the 
pawl. The pawl must return after coming off a tooth, so 
the spring is necessary.” (Ibid.)
Feynman then explains that he omitted a crucial detail in Fig. 
2, which is quite essential. In order to stop the pawl move-
ment after it comes off a tooth, we need to include in the sce-
nario: 
“[A]n essential part of the irreversibility of our wheel 
is a damping or deadening mechanism which stops the 
bouncing [of the pawl].” (Ibid.)
Then, Feynman explains how this mechanism effects the 
ratchet and pawl: 
“When the damping happens, of course, the energy that 
was in the pawl goes into the wheel and shows up as 
heat. So, as it turns, the wheel will get hotter and hotter. 
To make the thing simpler, we can put a gas around the 
wheel to take up some of the heat. Anyway, let us say the 
gas keeps rising in temperature, along with the wheel. 
Will it go on forever? No! The pawl and wheel, both at 
some temperature T, also have Brownian motion. This 
motion is such that, every once in a while, by accident, 
the pawl lifts itself up and over a tooth just at the moment 
when the Brownian motion on the vanes is trying to turn 
the axle backwards. And as things get hotter, this happens 
more often.” (Ibid., 1-2)
By assuming a canonical distribution function, Feynman 
then shows by a brief calculation that there is on average no 
net work done. That is, he concludes that his ratchet and pawl 
mechanism is nomologically impossible and the second law 
should not be rejected. 
Following this brief historical analysis of the evolution of 
Maxwell’s demon and the different possibilities of its scenar-
io, I will now turn to Einstein’s photon box TE. This latter 
case underlines an episode where the nomological possibility 
of Einstein’s scenario was deemed essential for the success 
of his TE.
3.3 Einstein/Bohr photon box 
Einstein, according to Bohr’s (1949) recollection, presented 
him with the photon box TE during the 6th Solvay confer-
ence. Einstein’s aim was to show that the Copenhagen inter-
pretation of quantum mechanics is inconsistent13, by attack-
ing Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle. 
The uncertainty principle, or uncertainty relations, in quan-
tum mechanics was first enunciated by Werner Heisenberg 
in 1927. Briefly, it says that the simultaneous measurement 
of two conjugate variables (such as momentum-position or 
time-energy) for a given particle, results in a limitation of the 
accuracy of each of these measures. Namely, the more accu-
rate the measurement of one of the conjugate variables is, the 
13 - The photon box TE was never published by Einstein. Also, his discussions with Bohr during the Solvay conference were not transcribed. It should be noted that there are two 
different historical interpretation of Einstein’s TE. Cf. Howard (1985, 1990) for a defense of a different version of Einstein’s conclusion, which points at the incompleteness, rather 
than the inconsistency, of quantum mechanics. Cf. El Skaf (2016) for an analysis of the identity of TEs involving three different photon boxes. In this section I will only present 
Bohr’s (1949) rendering of this episode.
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less accurate it will be for the other. For the energy (e) and 
time (t), the better the accuracy of the energy measurement, 
the less accurate the measurement of the time will be, and 
vice versa. 
With the photon box, Einstein aimed at refuting the time-en-
ergy uncertainty relation. According to Bohr, “Einstein pro-
posed the device indicated in [Fig. 3] consisting of a box with 
a hole in its side, which could be opened or closed by a shut-
ter moved by means of a clock-work within the box” (Bohr, 
1949, p. 225). He asks us to start by weighing the box, then 
open the door for a short time in which a single photon can 
escape from the box, and finally re-weigh the box. The clock 
gives us the time of passage of a photon, the balance gives 
us the difference in the mass of the box before and after the 
passage of a photon. By using Einstein’s equation E = mc² we 
can calculate the energy difference. This energy difference, 
in accordance with the principle of conservation of energy, 
would be the energy of the emitted photon. Therefore, one 
could in principle simultaneously measure the time of escape 
of a single photon and its energy, and that with an arbitrary 
degree of precision. Einstein concluded that this result is “in 
definite contradiction to the reciprocal indeterminacy of time 
and energy quantities in quantum mechanics” (Ibid., p. 226).
Fig. 3: Einstein’s 
photon box accord-
ing to Bohr (Ibid.)
The story accord-
ing to Bohr ended 
with his triumph. 
He found a flaw in 
Einstein’s scenario 
the day after that 
famous discussion: “After a sleepless night over this argu-
ment Bohr rebutted Einstein’s challenge with Einstein’s own 
general theory of relativity” (Jammer 1974, p. 134). The flaw 
for Bohr was to be found in the details of the imaginary device 
of the photon box, in particular the weighing process and its 
effect on the time measurement by the clock (Fig. 4). 
This is how Bohr argued: 
 
“This argument amounted to a serious challenge and gave 
rise to a thorough examination of the whole problem. At 
the outcome of the discussion, [...] it became clear, how-
ever, that this argument could not be upheld. In fact, in 
the consideration of the problem, [...] it was essential to 
take into account the relationship between the rate of a 
clock and its position in a gravitational field well known 
from the red-shift [...].
Our discussion concentrated on the possible application 
of an apparatus incorporating Einstein’s device and 
drawn in Fig. [4] in the same pseudo-realistic style as 
some of the preceding figures.” (My emphasis, Bohr 1949, 
p. 226)
Fig. 4: Bohr’s 
photon box (Ibid., 
p. 227).
The difference 
between the two 




by Bohr to the 
specific details 
of such a device. 
Bohr’s analysis 
concentrates on a 
better description 
of the scenario, 
in particular he fully described how the weighing procedure 
should be done, with a spring-balance, and the formulas that 
should describe its behaviour. In particular, Bohr shows that 
the weighing procedure will require the box to move in a 
gravitational field. Thus
 
“[A]ccording to general relativity theory, a clock, when 
displaced in the direction of the gravitational force [...] 
will change its rate.” (Ibid.)
Bohr is arguing that the accuracy of the time measurement by 
a clock moving in a gravitational field should be given by Ein-
stein’s own general relativity, and not with a classical space-
time theory, as Einstein seemed to suggest. 
Which leads Bohr to conclude:
“Consequently, a use of the apparatus as a means of accu-
rately measuring the energy of the photon will prevent us 
from controlling the moment of its escape.” (Ibid., p. 228)
By fully describing the box weighing mechanism and its effect 
on the behaviour of the clock reading, since it is now said to 
move in a gravitational field, arguably what Bohr is doing is 
to refute the scenario’s nomological possibility under the ap-
plicable theory (i.e., general relativity).
Bohr concludes, contrary to Einstein, that we cannot simul-
taneously and accurately predict the photon’s energy and its 
time of escape, by doing simultaneous and accurate measure-
ments on the box, since this latter operation is now nomolog-
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ically impossible.14 
4 – How TEs evolve: back-
ground to foreground dynamic
Both case studies, Maxwell’s and Einstein’s, and their evo-
lutions, be it in Bohr’s reply the day after or Feynman’s TE a 
century later, bring to light a certain dynamic. It consists in 
the passage from the “background” to the “foreground”15 of 
some elements described in the scenario. I take them to be:
- Background elements: Processes that are not sufficient-
ly described. The TEer makes reference to such processes 
when he/she judges that the assessment of their nomo-
logical possibility is not necessary for the purpose of the 
TE. 
- Foreground elements: Processes that are sufficiently 
described in a way that we can (and should) assess their 
nomological possibility under the relevant theories.
The evolution of a TE usually consists in changing some ele-
ments of its scenario, in particular by better describing them, 
theoretically and technically: relevant processes are promot-
ed, so to speak, from the background – where their nomolog-
ical possibility is assumed (e.g. Einstein weighing and time 
measuring processes, Einstein being pulling an elevator in a 
gravitational free space) or ignored (Maxwell’s demon mode 
of operation) – to the foreground – where their nomological 
possibility should and can be assessed.
This is what happens in Bohr’s reply and in Smoluchowski’s 
and Feynman’s TEs. The difference between these two pro-
motions of the relevant processes, from the background to 
the foreground, is to be found in the purpose of the original 
scenario, and in the purpose of the evolved one. In the for-
mer case, Bohr judged that the processes, sketched by Ein-
stein, should be better described in order to assess his TE. 
By contrast, in the latter cases, Smoluchowski and Feynman 
brought the demon mode of operation to the foreground in 
order to assess if the second law should be completely reject-
ed, and not simply modified or limited. That is, the molecular 
separation process is better described and promoted to the 
foreground with the aim of answering different questions and 
not of refuting Maxwell’s TE, or his conclusion.
This dynamic is directly found in Feynman’s (1977) analysis. 
This is how he introduces his TE: “Let us try to invent a de-
vice which will violate the Second Law of Thermodynamics 
[...]. Now let us ask if this is possible.” Feynman then tells us 
“if we just look at [the scenario], we see, prima facie, that it 
seems quite possible” and we can conclude that the second 
law should be completely rejected. Nevertheless, he empha-
sizes that “we must look more closely”, and if we do “we see 
a number of complications” (My emphasis, Feynman et al. 
1977, 46-1, 1). That is, in passing the relevant processes from 
the background to the foreground and assessing their possi-
bility, we should see that the original scenario is nomologi-
cally impossible and the second law should not be rejected. 
TEs, thus, possess the capacity to evolve, which can be seen 
as directly linked to the possibility claims involved in their 
scenarios – specifically, the possibility of the processes de-
scribed. When presented with a nomologically possible sce-
nario (e.g., Einstein’s photon box), we can either challenge 
the theory (Einstein’s conclusion), or the possibility of the 
processes involved (Bohr’s reply). Nevertheless, when the 
scenario is not presented as nomologically possible, as in 
Maxwell’s original demon, the process’ possibility is not, and 
cannot, be challenged. The TE works even if the scenario pre-
sented is not strictly nomologically possible. What matters in 
Maxwell’s demon case is the nomological possibility of the 
result of such a process – i.e., fast molecules on one side and 
slow ones on the other. This result is nomologically possible 
under the kinetic theory and nothing in the dynamical in-
terpretation of the second law prohibits such result. This is 
so, even if the molecular separation process remains in the 
background, where its nomological possibility is ignored. 
This suffices to show a tension between thermodynamics and 
kinetic theory. Maxwell’s demon TE, thus, aims at showing 
an external incoherence between these two theories. In order 
to restore theoretical coherence, Maxwell concludes that the 
second law of thermodynamics should be statistical. 
5 – Conclusion
In the introduction, I have separated the questions that each 
epistemic account of TEs should address into two sets. The 
first set concerns epistemic issues and addresses what TEs 
are, how they function, how they justify their conclusions 
and the nature of the new knowledge they purport to pro-
vide. The second set concerns modal issues and addresses 
the way possibility has to be construed in TEs. I have argued 
that attention has been paid mostly to the first set. Moreover, 
when scholars come to the second set, arguably they commit 
themselves to what I have called the Nomological Possibility 
Thesis (NPT for short) – i.e., the claim that a successful TE 
should involve a nomologically possible scenario. However, 
thanks to the Maxwell’s demon case, I have shown that NPT 
is too restrictive. Arguably, this is a successful TE which in-
volves a scenario whose nomological possibility remains in-
determinate. The upshot is that what is at issue in some TEs is 
14 - If all conceivable scenarios were shown to be nomologically impossible by Bohr is a different question that I will not address here. My aim is simply to show that Einstein’s 
description of the relevant processes is insufficient in this case. It should be clear, though, after Bohr’s reply, that the burden of proof is now on the critic of the uncertainty principle 
to furnish a nomologically possible scenario.
15 - I wish to thank John Norton for his suggestion to use the “background”, “foreground” terminology. 
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misrepresented by accounts adopting NPT (e.g., Nersessian’s 
mental model, Gendler’s as if actuality, Buzzoni’s Transcen-
dental-Operational account and Laymon’s or Sorensen’s ex-
perimental accounts). These accounts are at least not general 
enough to include TEs, like Maxwell’s demon, containing es-
sentially under-described background processes. Moreover, 
contrary to Kuhn’s claim, the data could be “unfamiliar” and 
“strange”. The TEer should in fact be allowed, in some cases, 
to imagine far-fetched  scenarios such that their nomological 
possibility remains indeterminate. 
The notion of possibility relevant in each TE should thus de-
pend on at least three factors: (i) the function of the TE, (ii) 
our knowledge of the nomological possibility of the relevant 
processes, and (iii) the relevance of nomologically possible 
processes to the TE’s conclusion.
 
Accordingly, the nomological possibility of Maxwell’s demon 
could remain open, since he was not trying to show that we 
can conceive of an in principle, nearly realizable scenario 
contradicting the second law. In addition, we don’t know 
about the nomological possibility of all conceivable demons. 
And even if we did, it is irrelevant to Maxwell’s conclusion.
By contrast in the Einstein/Bohr case explicit nomological 
possibility should be required, since Einstein was trying to 
show that we can conceive of a near realizable scenario that 
contradicts Heisenberg’s principle. Moreover, we know that 
clocks run slower in gravitational fields. Finally, the nomo-
logical possibility of an accurate clock is relevant to Einstein’s 
conclusion. 
Epistemic accounts of TEs should thus permit more latitude 
to the scientist in conceiving his/her scenario. While some 
TEs are assessed from what we know about our world and the 
theories that describe it (e.g., clocks in a gravitational field 
are inaccurate and are correctly described within relativity 
theory), others leave the nomological possibility open with-
out assuming a potential real-world situation or its ideal limit 
(e.g., whether Maxwell believed that our theories, or technol-
ogy, would someday give us possible, or actual, demons is not 
an issue relevant to the TE). If we understand these latter as 
limiting cases of real experiments or as situations that mimic 
potential real-world processes, we run the risk to weaken a 
strong TE with misplaced criticism. Here lies the specificity 
of some TEs compared to other scientific tools, such as com-
puter simulation or real experiments.
My conclusions are based on the analysis of a specific exam-
ple, namely Maxwell’s demon. However, one might deny that 
this is a TE and thus undermine my conclusions. Ian Hack-
ing (1992), for instance, “resist[s] calling Maxwell’s demon 
part of a thought experiment. It is part of a fantasy. Here 
I agree with Nersessian, who has remarked to me that it is 
hard to see what is experimental about the demon. Perhaps 
it is only a rhetorical device to reinforce Maxwell’s statistical 
analysis. The demon does not, for me, prove even the possi-
bility of anything. […] But is it a thought experiment? […] 
The problem with Maxwell’s demon as an experiment is that 
you can’t conduct it at all, no matter how much fantasy and 
idealization you allow yourself” (My emphasis, Hacking 1992, 
pp. 302-303). 
It is true that there is nothing experimental about the demon, 
since the TE leaves the nomological possibility indeterminate. 
Hacking concludes that Maxwell’s demon is best seen as a 
“rhetorical device”, rather than a TE. The problem is that his 
claim is clearly based on a specific conception of TEs which 
flirts with NPT, thus limiting their scope to nearly realizable 
experiments. Still the question is open: is Maxwell’s demon a 
genuine TE? To answer this question, we need a fine-grained 
account of what TEs are (i.e., we need to answer the epistemic 
first set of questions), which is beyond the scope of this pa-
per. Note, however, that Maxwell’s demon is readily treated 
in the literature on TEs as a canonical example of a scientific 
TE. Hence, there seem to be at least prima facie reasons to 
consider it a TE.
What has been said about the two case studies discussed in 
this paper can also shed some light on the debate between 
John D. Norton and James Robert Brown. In addressing the 
first set of questions, Norton (since 1991) characterizes TEs 
as deductive or inductive arguments, whereas Brown (since 
1986) characterizes some TEs as Platonic vehicles to laws of 
nature. Although both views could easily account for scenari-
os whose nomological possibility remains indeterminate, and 
even for impossible scenarios, they do not explicitly address 
these issues. Thus, this debate might seem irrelevant to the 
present purpose. In my opinion this is not the case and some 
interesting relevant points can be highlighted.
As far as Brown’s view is concerned, it is hard to see the role 
Platonic perception might play in both Maxwell’s demon and 
Einstein/Bohr case. Indeed, Brown does not treat these case 
studies as Platonic TEs. However, Brown acknowledges, per-
haps unwittingly, that Maxwell’s demon TE can be seen as 
an argument à la Norton. In his own words: “In one sense, 
Norton’s account fits this example perfectly. We start with the 
statistical theory and we derive the probabilistic version of 
the second law; so we have a deductive argument. And the 
demon, as Norton says, is a ‘particular [which is] irrelevant 
to the generality of the conclusion.’ In fact, the demon is ut-
terly unnecessary; we can derive the conclusion without in-
voking it at all” (Brown 1992, p. 274). It should be clear by 
now that I disagree with such an analysis, in particular with 
the irrelevance of the demon and with the idea that the TE 
was intended to derive a probabilistic version of the second 
law of thermodynamics. This was not the aim of Maxwell’s 
demon TE, simply because the demon violates any version of 
the second law with a probability equal to a unity. Thus, the 
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TE would turn out to be ineffective for its (alleged) purpose!
As for Norton, he reduces TEs to “disguised” arguments that 
involve irrelevant and eliminable particulars.16 Nevertheless, 
the two case studies offered here suggest that we should give 
more importance to the nature and function of the elements 
involved in a TE’s scenario. We have seen how the Einstein/
Bohr photon box episode should be analysed in light of the 
possibility of the processes described in each version of the 
TE. Precisely these processes prove to be pivotal for both the 
defence and the rebuttal of the TE. Also, Maxwell’s demon 
underlines the function of under-described fictive particulars 
and their dynamics in a TE’s scenario: they give rise to fic-
tive processes whose nomological possibility remains open. 
More precisely, Maxwell’s demon TE raises the following 
questions: if the argument includes a premise concerning 
the demon’s action, then what will its truth value be? Will 
we have a sound or valid argument for this good TE? If the 
argument does not include the demon’s action, then which 
premises will it include and will it have the same function or 
epistemic power as that of the TE? This last question is espe-
cially important in the light of the twentieth century, as well 
as recent, evolutions of the demon’s TE.
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